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"THAT'S NOT WHAT FERPA SAYS!": THE TENTH
CIRCUIT COURT GIVES DANGEROUS BREADTH TO

FERPA IN ITS CONFUSING AND CONTRADICTORY
FALVO V. OWASSO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
DECISION

I. INTRODUCTION
1

Falvo v. Owasso Independent School District began in an
Oklahoma District Court as a suit by Kristja Falvo on behalf of
her children against the school district and several teachers
and administrators within the district. Ms. Falvo's middle
school children were affected by the district's grading practices,
and Ms. Falvo sought relief in court. When the district court
granted summary judgment to the school district, she appealed. The lOth Circuit Court judges who heard the case on
appeal held that the grading practices in question infringed on
the children's right to privacy as delineated in the Family Edu2
cational and Right to Privacy Act (FERPA). As a Federal appeals decision, Falvo directly affects all school districts within
3
the lOth circuit's boundaries. As a case of first impression on
this issue, it may also be influential for other circuits deciding
similar issues.
This note will discuss both procedural and substantive arguments on the FERPA issues addressed by the lOth Circuit
Court. Part I introduces the case and its history; Part II discusses the procedural arguments, focusing on those against the
lOth circuit's ruling; Part III examines the substantive arguments against the lOth Circuit Court's decision on the merits in
Falvo. Part IV is the conclusion.

1. 220 F.3d 1200, 146 ED. LAW REP. 641, 2000 CJ C.A.R. 4563 (lO'h Cir. Oklahoma 2000), withdrawn on denial of rehearing en bane and replaced by 229 F.3d 956
(10'h Cir. 2000).
2. 20 U.S.C.A. §1232.
3. The Tenth Circuit encompasses Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming.
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Background

The story began in 1997 when Ms. Falvo's children com4
plained about being embarrassed in class. The family had recently moved into the district, and was unfamiliar with a grading practice common in many school districts around the
nation; peer-to-peer grading. Students were asked to exchange
quiz papers, grade those quiz papers according to guidelines set
by the teacher, and give the quizzes back to their original owners. They then had the option of either telling the teacher their
scores orally in front of the class, or coming up to the teacher
and privately reporting their score.
The more Ms. Falvo heard about this and how it affected
5
her children, the less she liked it. She talked to administra6
tors, including the superintendent of the school district, about
changing the policy. Administrators did not see a problem, especially in light of the fact that many student-graded quizzes
7
never make it into the gradebook, and that students who may
be embarrassed by the process have the opportunity to report
8
their grades in confidence. Ms. Falvo adamantly felt that the
9
grading practice should be changed. She then asked for a temporary injunction to stop teachers from using this grading practice. The court did not issue an injunction, choosing instead to
grant the school district more time to prepare a defense.
Meanwhile, Ms. Falvo filed suit claiming 14'h Amendment and
FERPA violations. The district court agreed with the school

4. Scott Cooper, Grading System is Challenged, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 11, 1998 at
19.
5. Scott Cooper , Owasso Case Before Judge, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 15, 1998 at 11,
explaining Falvo's concerns: ridicule of her son and targeting of her daughter which she
attributes to the grading practice.
6. "Published Opinions," compiled by Anthony Sammons, THE JouRNAL RECORD,
8/10/00 J. Rec.; 2000 WL 14297550.
7. Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist., 229 F.3d 956, 970 (stating at least some
grades are then recorded in the teachers gradebook).
8. !d. at 962.
9. "There comes a time when I have to say it's time to make a change." Cooper,
supra note 4, at 19; "(Falvo's] goal is for the district to adopt a policy prohibiting students from grading other tests and reading grades aloud." Cooper, supra note 5, at 11;
"I felt very strongly about it. I felt there was a large population of students being exposed to this grading practice, and it was affecting their learning." Kelly Kurt, Peer
Grading Fails in Court Test, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 2, 2000 at 19; "It wasn't that I was
angry and wanted to get at teachers. I just wanted to change policy." Diane Plumberg,
Nation to Feel Effects oft he Grading Lawsuit, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 6, 2000 at
4-A.

327]

THE TENTH CIRCUIT AND FERPA

329

district that both of those claims should be dismissed. Ms.
Falvo then attempted to eradicate the grading practice by
amending her complaint so that it included a cause of action
brought under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
10
(IDEA) on behalf of her mainstreamed son. However, the
court disallowed the amendment because it was filed too late.
Ms. Falvo appealed the case. After the parties had presented their arguments, the court issued an opinion written by
Judge Murphy in which the dismissal of the 14th amendment
claim was upheld, but the dismissal of the FERPA claim was
overturned. The court held that the grading practice was illegal
not because the students reported their grades aloud, but be11
cause students had access to each other's work.
In order for this rationale to work legally, the court decided
that the "education record," which under FERPA could not be
disclosed without permission, consisted of the student work it12
self. The school district asked the court for a rehearing en
bane, but the request was denied by a 9-to-4 vote. However,
Judge Murphy did consider the school district's points after a
fashion, withdrawing the previous opinion and replacing it
with one addressing those issues. As of this writing it is uncertain whether the school district will file further appeals.

B.

Initial Concerns

There are some good reasons why Judge Murphy ruled the
way he did. However, better reasons indicate that Falvo only
makes for confusing and impractical law. In the wake of the
Falvo decision, school districts within the lOth circuit have ear13
nestly attempted to comply. They have sent home a flurry of
permission forms asking parental sanction for grading practices which used to be taken for granted by students, teachers,
and parents alike. School officials have speculated as to
whether they can allow displays of student art. Teachers debate if they can afford to keep checking for cognition by giving
quizzes and not be snowed under with the paperwork of grad10. Ms. Falvo wanted to claim that the grading practice violated IDEA privacy
right provisions.
11. 20 USCA § 1232(g)(b)(1) "... policy or practice of permitting the release of
education records .... "
12. Falvo, 229 F.3d at 971.
13. Jennifer Toomer-Cook, School Ruling Affects Utahns, THE DESERET NEWS,
Sept. 9, 2000 at BO.l.
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ing it all themselves. Parents are confused by the paperwork
now necessary so that their children can engage in normal and
everyday school activities.
II.

A.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND ANALYSIS

Improper Ruling on Appeal from Summary Judgment

Falvo came to the lOth circuit in the posture of an appeal
from summary judgment for the school district. As such, Judge
Murphy and the other judges needed to interpret all evidence
in the light most favorable to Ms. Falvo and her children,
which they did. However, they should have stopped at the interpretation. Instead of remanding for a trial, they went ahead
and ruled on several issues, most notably the expansion of the
definition of "education record" and the creation of an agency
relationship between the students and the school. Regardless of
FERPA's ambiguity or lack thereof, another appellate court has
stated that "the existence of facts giving rise to a principleagent relationship is generally a question reserved for the trier
14
of fact." Thus, if nothing else, the lOth Circuit Court should
have remanded this decision back to the trial level for a determination of fact.
B.

Authority to Bring the Claim

Because the FERPA statute only offers administrative
15
remedies, courts are in dispute about whether it is possible to
bring a private action to enforce redress of statutory violations.
16
As of 1998, when Falvo was filed in district court, most courts
14. Knapp v. Hill, 276 Ill. App. 3''376, 382 (1995).
15. 20 U.S.C.S. §1232g(g) (West 2000).
16. Odom v. Columbia University, 906 F. Supp. 188, 105 Ed. Law Rep. 491 (1995);
Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102, 104 (5'" Cir. 1989); Norris v. Board of Educ., 797 F.
Supp. 1452, 77 Ed. Law Rep. 255, (S.D. Ind. 1992); Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Mattox,
830 F.2d 576 (5'" Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1008 (1998); Fay v. South Colonie
Central Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1986); Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d
1267 (8'" Cir. 1977); Krebs v. Rutgers, 797 F. Supp. 1246 (D.N.J. 1992); Francois v.
Univ. of District of Columbia, 788 F. Supp. 31 (D.C. 1992); Tombrello v. USX Corp., 763
F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Smith v. Duquesne Univ., 612 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Pa.
1985), affd 787 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1986); Price v. Young, 580 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark.
1983). See also Lewin v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, 910 F. Supp. 1161 (E. D.
Va. 1996); Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., No. 94-203120-6 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1997).
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had held that FERPA does not provide a private right of action.17 However, there is a growing trend to allow private actions based on another federal statute, which allows private
class actions to force government compliance with other statutes.18 The standard for allowing these class actions is a bit
counter-intuitive. The underlying statute (in this case, FERPA)
must both give the plaintiff an enforceable right and not provide another means of redress. In order for Ms. Falvo to win,
the court should have found more than that the school district
19
was in violation of FERPA. It had to decide that FERPA gave
her an enforceable right which was not taken away by express
20
or implied congressional action, and that this right was in fact
violated by the grading practices in question. Of course, the lOth
21
Circuit Court did decide that. Whether it should have is another matter.

C.

§1983 Enforceable Right and Binding Obligation

The basic elements of a §1983 claim are: 1) is the plaintiff
an intended beneficiary of the statute; 2) are the plaintiffs
claims too "vague and amorphous" for the court to enforce; 3)
22
does the statute impose a binding obligation on the state?
Few would doubt that the statute was intended to benefit students and the parents of minor children. Indeed, Senator Buckley, who proposed the statute, wanted students and parents to
be able to view education records in order to check for inaccu24
racies.2:1 The statute names those who would benefit. There is

17. For evidence that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action,
see the "Joint Statement." See also Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (must look to
entire legislative enactment when determining the existence of a private right).
18. U.S.C.A. §1983 (West 2000); imposes liability on anyone who, under color of
state law, deprives a person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws." (quoted in 117 S.Ct. 1353); Ralph Mawdsley, Litigation Involving FERPA, 110 EDUC. LAW REP. 897, 910-11 (1996).
19. Golden Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (holding that,
in order to use §1983 to enforce other statutes, the plaintiff must claim that there was
a violation of a federal right, not merely of federal law).
20. Ackerly Communications of Florida, Inc. v. Henderson, 881 F.2d 990 (11"' Cir.
1989) (no §1983 private right because Congress created an exclusive remedy); Wright v.
Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418,423 (1987).
21. Falvo, 229 F.3d at 966.
22. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) quoting Wilder v. Virginia Hospital
Assn. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
23. Nicholas Trott Long, Privacy in the World of Education: What Hath James
Buckley Wrought?, 46 Feb R.I.B.J. 9 (1998); Mawdsley, supra note 18,.
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also little doubt that Ms. Falvo's claim was very specific. She
identified a particular grading practice and asked the court to
25
eradicate it. She thus clearly meets the second element. The
third element is a little trickier, though. Some evidence supports the contention that the lO'h circuit was misled in finding
that FERPA imposes a binding obligation on the states to comply. In order to examine this we need to know what courts
mean when they say "binding obligation."
1. Congressional Intent
There is a difference between a binding obligation that
Congress places on the states and Congressional preference for
a state action to occur. The first will fulfill the § 1983 binding
obligation element; the second will not. The single penalty provided in the statute seems to weigh on the side of congressional
preference rather than congressional mandate; the only repercussion for disobeying FERPA provisions is a withdrawal of
26
federal funding. "[FERPA] conditions the receipt of federal
education funding on compliance, rather than directly requir27
ing deference to it." There are no criminal sanctions. There is
no personal liability. In fact, Senator Buckley was quite concerned that teachers not bear the burden of possible violations.
If Congress had really wanted to express a mandate that
FERPA be followed, it would have imposed private individual
28
civil sanctions rather than rely upon contractuality. If Congress were interested in creating a binding obligation carrying
a private right of action, it would have anticipated and welcomed the possibility of actions by affected citizens against the
persons committing the violations.

24. 20 U.S.C.S. §1232g(b) & (e).
25. For claims that have been found "too vague and amorphous," see id. at 344
("the Court of Appeals erred ... in taking a blanket approach to determining whether
Title IV-D creates rights.") For an example of a sufficiently well-defined claim, see
Parry v. Crawford, 990 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Nev 1998).
26. 20 U.S.C.A. §1232(g) (West 2000).
27. Sandra L. Macklin , Students' Rights in Indiana: Wrongful Di.~tribution of
Student Records and Potential Remedies, 74 IND. L.J. 1321 (Fall 1999).
28. Federal funds may be withdrawn if they are used in ways inconsistent with
the terms on which they were given; the Supreme Court has said that this is based
upon contract theory.
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2. Congressional Remedies Provision
Congress did provide a remedy for violations. It is an administrative remedy, but a remedy nonetheless. As set forth in
the statute, the Family Policy Compliance Office in the Department of Education is in charge of overseeing FERPA viola2
tions and investigating claims. ~J The way the remedy is carried
out seems to indicate a preference on the part of Congress
rather than a mandate. Parents and students alleging violations have the opportunity to request a hearing from the Office.
"There is no timeline for processing these complaints, no administrative hearing provisions, and no framework for judicial
review. There are no remedies for parties injured by [FERPA]
violations and the onlv sanction available against schools has
.
d .,3cf
never b een Impose
While this history may indicate the need for FERPA violations to be accessible through a § 1983 claim, it also shows that
Congress did not intend to create an obligation for the schools
to follow the policy. Furthermore, a viable minority rule regarding FERPA's administrative enforcement possibilities
states that, "[s]ection 1983 does not create a private right for
damages where the federal statute provides an exclusive ad31
ministrative enforcement mechanism."
The 10'h Circuit Court was wrong in finding that the statute
gave Ms. Falvo and her children an enforceable civil rights
claim. It should have dismissed the case on the grounds that
she did not meet all elements of a §1983 claim.
D.

Statutory Construction

The 10'h Circuit Court also erred in its refusal to look at
Department of Education practices when it interpreted the
statute. The Court held that FERPA is plain on its face, and
therefore no other tools of statutory construction were necessary.:32 If the statute were indeed plain on its face, the court
would be correct. However, legal scholars' confusion and the
opinion's internal inconsistency shows that FERPA is not clear
29. 20 U.S.C.A. §1232(g) (West 2000); Mawdsley, supra note 18, ; Macklin, supra
note 27.
30. Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up Buckley I: Making the Federal Student Records
Statute Work, 46 CAUL U. L. REV. 617 (Spring 1997).
31. Norris v. Board of Education, 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1464 (1992).
32. Falvo, 229 F.3d at 968.
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within its four corners.

III. ANALYSIS OF FALVO's MERITS
A.

FERPA's Language

In Falvo, the lO'h Circuit Court determined Owasso's grading policy is a violation of FERPA because student-to-student
grading is considered an improper maintaining of an educational record. In this section, the discussion will focus on the
arguments against this interpretation of FERPA, and why the
lOth Circuit Court was unnecessarily broad in interpreting that
student-to-student grading is a violation thereof.
FERPA tells us that, "[n]o Funds shall be made available
under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the re33
lease of education records ... of students .... " : "For the purposes of this section, the term 'education records' means ...
those records, files, documents, and other materials which-(i)
contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are
maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a per4
son acting for such agency or institution.":J
First, the lOth Circuit Court concluded that a student's
grade, before reaching the teacher's grade book, constitutes an
"education record." The court states: "There is no dispute that
the grades which students place on each other's papers and
then report to the teacher 'contain information directly related
to a student' and thus satisfy the first element of the statutory
1
definition for 'education record."': " This may be true, especially
since it appears that Congress intended the statute's language
to be broad with this element of "education record." But the
court continues to carve out a broad interpretation with the
second element of "education record":
The grade the correcting student places on the paper is also
"maintained", because that student is preserving the grade
until the time it is reported to the teacher for further use. In
sum, the grades which students mark, at the teacher's direction, on each other's homework and test papers and later re-

33. 20 U.S.C.S. §1232g(b)(l) (West 2000).
34. Id. at (a)(4)(A).
35. Falvo, 229 F.3d at 970.
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port to the teacher are "maintained ... by a person acting for
36
[an educational] agency or institution."
The court obviously had a very difficult choice to make with
this case, choosing between the embarrassment of students and
creating a policy that may encourage massive confusion and inefficiency for teachers. But what the court seemed to miss in
deciding for the students is that making this grading system a
violation of FERPA is both a legal contradiction and a moot
point in the classroom itself.
The court claimed that its finding was "[b]ased purely on
37
the language of the statute itself. .. " and argued that Congress was clear in its intent to protect grade disclosure in
teachers' grade books, and that FERPA is unambiguous in its
language. When a grade is actually in a teacher's grade book, it
may be an "education record" that is "maintained" according to
the statute Also, the court rightly decided that the narrow exception Congress provided grade books applies only when the
38
teacher discloses her grade book to a substitute. However, it
is doubtful that Congress intended for the interpretation of
"maintained by ... a person acting for [an educational] agency
or institution" to be so broad as to include student-to-student
grading.

B. The Ambiguity of FERPA's Language
1. Agency
One must assume that Congress intended an agency relationship to apply when it chose the phrase "person acting for
such institution or agency." Agency, as defined by Black's Law
Dictionary, is "a fiduciary relationship created by express or
implied contract or by law, whereby one party (the agent) may
act on behalf of another party (the principal) and bind that
39
other party by words and actions." Agent is defined as "one
who is authorized to act for or in place of another; a representative."40 Courts have narrowly construed agency relationships
between students and schools; they are hesitant to assign the
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

/d. at 971.
/d. at 969.
See id. at 970.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 63 (6'" ed. 1990).
!d. at 62.
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agent label to students because of potential liability. In conjunction with Black's definition of "agent" ("one who is author42
ized to act for or in place of another,") the decision in Booker
43
v. Chicago Board of Education should be persuasive. The
court in Booker said that the student hall monitor had no responsibility given her by the teacher because "her function was
44
to report any misbehavior to the teacher." The hall monitor
had no authority to decide what comprised the infractions, only
that the infractions happened. It is the same situation with
students grading other students' papers-the grading student
has no authority to decide what is a right or wrong answer; she
can only mark answers "correct" or "incorrect" according to
what the teacher tells her is "correct" and "incorrect."
Since a student in almost all cases does not fit the definition of "agent," the court incorrectly stated that the FERPA
statute is "unambiguous." There is no legislative history explaining what the phrase meant to the legislators, nor is there
any further guidance from Congress as to what "maintaining"
and "person acting" specifically refers. If Congress was unwilling to define this further, the court may decide its breadth but
not without admitting that it is unclear on its face.

2. Consent
Referring to the consent requirement in an agency relationship, the court in Wickey v. Dawn Sparks stated, "[a]gency is a
relationship resulting from the manifestation of consent by one
party to another that the latter will act as an agent for the

41. See Booker v. Chicago Board of Education, 75 III. App. 3d 381 (1979), where
the court found a student hall monitor was not an agent of the school when she assaulted another student in a school bathroom; Knapp v. Hill, 276 Ill. App. 3d 376
(1995) where the court found no agency relationship where a student was directed by a
teacher to bring his car into the shop area and drive it out again when class was over,
stating "such control alone is insufficient to establish a principal-agent relationship"
!d. at 380; Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999), where the Court
found a school district can be held liable for student-on-student sexual harassment only
for that district's own failure to respond to such harassment, but not liable for the student's inappropriate behavior, thus coming under sexual discrimination and violating
Equal Protection; Christensen v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy & Surgery,
248 Iowa 810 (1957), where the court found an agency relationship where a medical
intern performs as a practitioner of the medical profession under the guidance of college-affiliated hospital staff.
42. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (6'" ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
43. 75 Ill. App. 3d 381 (1979).
44. !d. at 455.
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45

former." Students certainly do not consent to being agents for
the school, nor do their parents, thus the student cannot be
considered an agent of the school.
3. The Rooker Letter
The Falvo court should not have dismissed consideration of
the "Rooker Letter" as it did. The "Rooker Letter," written by
the Director of the Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO)
within the United States Department of Education, LeRoy S.
Rooker, was a 1993 response to inquiries made by the New
York State United Teachers union representative about the legality under FERPA of certain school policies. The Rooker Letter states that
FERPA would not prohibit teachers from allowing students to
grade a test or homework assignment of another student or
from calling out that grade in class, even though such grade
may eventually become an education record. Such papers being graded and the grades which will be assigned would fall
outside the FERPA definition of education records as they are
not, strictly speaking, "maintained" by an educational agency
46
or institution at that point.

The lOth Circuit Court claims that "the Rooker letter ... [isJ
bereft of any reasoning underlying the rather conclusory opinion that grades written down by other students and announced
to the teacher are not 'maintained' as required under
47
FERPA". Ironically, the court commits the same error it condemns by neglecting to give any definable reason for why it
rules that grades written down are "maintained" under
FERPA. Similarly, the court only states that "in so assisting
the teacher, the correcting student becomes a 'person acting for
48
[an educational] agency or institution."' In this, the court actually creates a tautology; the court says that the student is
acting as the school's agent because the student assists that
teacher in an agent capacity. It is both inequitable and legally
impractical for the court to adopt this circular logic.
Under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

45.
46.
47.
48.

642 N.E.2d 262, 269 (2d D.Ct. 1994).
Rooker Letter (Dept. of Educ. 1993).
Falvo, 229 F. 3d at 969.
Id. at 971.
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Council, Inc., a court must defer to the reasonable interpretation set out in a regulation pronounced by the agency in charge
of administering the statute, when that statute the court is
asked to construe is ambiguous. Even though the Sufreme
Court recently stated in Christensen u. Harris Count/ that,
"the Chevron deference does not extend to an interpretation
contained in an opinion letter issued by the administering
51
agency," the Court also stated that, "interpretations contained
52
in agency opinion letters 'are entitled to respect."' Even if the
deference is not necessary, because FERPA is ambiguous, the
lOth Circuit Court should have given greater respect than it did
to the "Rooker Letter."
C.

Practical Impact

1. Implications for the Teachers
In the wake of the Falvo decision, school teachers have had
to make drastic changes to accommodate this new law. But
there is one situation in which there has been no change,and is
proper within the lOth Circuit Court's interpretation of FERPA:
students who are teachers' assistants (T.A.'s). To be able to record grades in the teachers' grade books, these student T.A.'s
must sign a confidentiality statement and in essence contract
to become a school official in that capacity. Many teachers,
even before the lOth Circuit Court's ruling, were following this
policy. The point is this: if the student T.A. must sign a contract to become an agent of the school, how does it make sense
for every other student to become that school's same agent
when they do not consent to contract, make no agreement with
the teacher or the school, and do not even record the grades in
the teacher's grade book?
While Ms. Falvo's feelings are understandable, and the embarrassment her children suffered unfortunate, this case involved an individual privacy issue, not a statutory privacy issue, i.e. this problem should have been handled by the teacher
on an individual basis between the Falvo children, the teacher,

49. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
50. 120 S.Ct. 1655 (2000).
51. Falvo, 229 F. 3d at 969.
52. !d. at 969, quoting Christensen, 120 S.Ct. at 1663; See also Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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and Ms. Falvo. In fact, Ms. Falvo apparently never tried to talk
to her children's teachers-she went directly to the school
counselors and the superintendent to have the grading policy
ceased schoolwide. She could have asked the teacher to call for
her children's grades in confidence. She could have consulted
the teacher about a trusted friend that could possibly grade her
children's papers instead of someone who would make fun of
them. She may have wished to avoid making the situation
worse for her children, and instead sought a pre-emptive strike
by circumventing the teachers' authority altogether. Unfortunately, pre-emptive strikes sometimes create much larger problems than the ones they try to avoid in the first place. In this
case, Ms. Falvo wanted more than just to alleviate her own
children's embarrassment; she sought to rescue all children
from the grading policy, assuming she knew best for all the
students' situations, with the sad result of unnecessarily expanding the scope of a federal statute.
2. Implications for the Students

The last point that requires discussion is the practical effect
this decision has had on the students themselves. Again, the
lOth Circuit Court clearly wanted to relieve the children of any
future embarrassment. But what Judge Murphy and the two
other panel judges did not realize is that children know who is
getting good grades and who is getting the bad grades anyway.
In fact, some students even call aloud just after the grading is
done, "Hey, who has my test? Whad'I get?" Even when numbers
are given to the students to ensure confidentiality, many students ask who has their numbered test. Students generally
want the immediacy of having their papers graded. The Falvo
decision may eradicate the procedure of peer grading, but it
does nothing to really protect privacy in the classroom, and we
cannot expect the courts to silence each individual child at that
point. Granted, the students can grade their own papers, and
some teachers have had to adopt this tactic with careful hesitation.5a But why does the solution have to be so confined? The
53. It is more likely that cheating would occur when students grade their own papers than if they were to grade another's papers. It also causes serious inefficiency if
the teachers had to grade all the homework assignments themselves. Ms. Falvo did
state that her A-student eighth grader was hurt by another student who bullies her
and grades her papers wrong when they are right, see Scott Cooper, Owasso Case Before Judge, Tulsa World, Oct. 15, 1998, ai 11; thai is where the teacher has the ulti-
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solution is not so limited as the lOth Circuit Court would have
one believe.

D.

Public Policy

The Falvo decision is bad policy for several reasons. First, it
places control for teaching methods not in the hands of local
authorities or even local parent-teacher associations, but in the
hands of the federal government. School functions have traditionally been kept at a level of local control. While "local" does
sometimes mean as broad a territory as the state, it has never
meant an area as large as that encompassed by a federal Circuit Court's jurisdiction. Local control is a better because it enables the parents of the children at the schools to have a voice
on what goes on with their specific children. Falvo takes this
choice away from many parents in the realm of the lOth circuit.
This is not to say that Ms. Falvo did not have noble intent,
nor that FERPA in any respect fails to protect individual privacy rights. However, Ms. Falvo and the lOth Circuit Court neglect to distinguish between knowledge of grades and disclosure of grades-"[FERPA's] apparent purpose is to ensure
access to educational records for students and parents and to
4
protect the privacy of such records from the public at large.""
When the court decided that knowledge of grades equals disclosure of an education record, it took a logical leap into territory
which has never before been addressed and which leads to
abundant policy problems. Perhaps calling the grades out in
class steps over that knowledge-disclosure line, a problem
which again could have been dealt with by simply discussing it
with the teacher. But there is nothing convincing about Johnny
knowing that Susie got a 13/16 on her spelling test, writing
that score on her paper, and giving it back to her to give to the
teacher to record that in itself constitutes a violation of
FERPA.
It is also bad public policy to declare that the student work
itself is the education record. While this may make sense when
mate and final say in the grade received by all students. But was Ms. Falvo worried
about the grading policy itself, or the fact that her child was being bullied? The next
court deciding this issue should carefully distinguish between a serious breach of privacy and the all-too-common bullying of other students before ruling on such a farreaching policy.
54. Student Press Law Center v. Alexander, 778 F.Supp. 1227, 1228 (emphasis
added).
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teachers maintain the works in locally-mandated portfolios, it
leads us to the anomalous situation of kindergartners not being
able to display their art in the classroom without parental consent. What about art class? The point is that the Falvo decision
makes it difficult or impossible for some educational purposes
to be fulfilled. Displaying student art and papers creates an incentive for students do their best work, and shows examples of
how to do assignments. Teachers commonly use student-graded
quizzes as a check of what the students understand. There are
those who would scoff at these possibilities, and currently there
is no indication that Falvo will be interpreted even more
broadly to exclude any and all displays. But as commonly discussed in law classrooms around the nation, there is definitely
potential for that slippery slope.
IV. CONCLUSION
If teachers cannot use the tool of peer to peer grading, they
are left with three unsavory choices: 1) grade the papers themselves; 2) have the students grade their own; or 3) forego the
comprehension checks. The first option is impractical simply
because of the time it would take. The second carries an inherently greater likelihood of cheating. With the third option,
teachers would be less effective because they would not have
the information necessary to tailor their lessons to each class.
Of course students would want to protect the privacy of their
portfolios. But those are already protected by the fact that the
55
teacher maintains them. They do not need additional protection. There is nothing in the lOth Circuit Court or the Supreme
Court case history dictating the Falvo decision of the court of
appeals. In fact, there is enough ambiguity as to the construction of statutory elements of the claims to allow for another decision. Substantive and policy arguments show why the school
district should have been favored in this matter. The district
followed practice set by the Education Department. The Education Department, as the education agency of the Federal government, has the job of setting such practices.

55. Like a gradebook, portfolios would be maintained by an agent of the school,
and therefore not classifiable as "released."
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Hopefully, when other circuits address this issue as they eventually must, they will recall the policy nightmare of Falvo and
make a better choice.

Amy Bennett
Adrienne Brower

